|
In finance, a holdout problem occurs when a bond issuer is in default or nears default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure debt held by existing bond holders. Such exchange offers typically require the consent of holders of some minimum portion of the total outstanding debt, often in excess of 90%, because, unless the terms of the bond provide otherwise, non-consenting bondholders will retain their legal right to demand repayment of their bonds at par (the full face amount). Bondholders who withhold their consent and retain their right to seek the full repayment of original bonds, may disrupt the restructuring process, creating a situation known as the holdout problem. The "holdouts" gamble that the restructuring will take place despite the lack of their consent, potentially leading to full repayment of their bonds, while other bondholders receive reduced payments according to the terms of the restructuring. If the restructuring does not take place, they gain nothing. The claims of the holdouts may be insignificant enough, and bothersome enough, that the issuer may satisfy them in whole simply not to be bothered. Where bondholders are widely dispersed, as is often the case, it can be difficult to contact many holders. Further, many holders of small amounts of bonds have little incentive to invest the time and energy in evaluating the terms of the exchange offer. These factors represent substantial difficulties in obtaining the minimum consent levels. ==Holdout problem in sovereign debt restructuring== If countries face the danger of default, additional complications might occur and increase the Holdout problem:〔Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado (2013): The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings, p. 4-5〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「holdout problem」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|